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Liberalization in the Water Sector:  
Three leading models. 
 
Claude Ménard & Aleksandra Peeroo1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
Over the last 15 to 20 years, problems in the water sector have become more 
visible and pronounced. Developed countries struggle to provide the much needed 
investments to maintain and update their water systems. The main concern in less 
developed countries on the other side is the lack of access to safe drinking water 
which combined with inadequate sanitation causes more than five million deaths 
every year2. Being aware of these difficulties and the pervasive changes in other 
infrastructure sectors, one must note the remarkably slow pace of reform in the water 
sector. Moreover, the most systematic reforms until now have been implemented in 
developed countries although the situation of the water sector seems less urgent 
than in the developing world3.  
By reform, we mean substantial changes in decision rights, changes that 
modify the governance and in many cases the allocation of property rights of the 
existing operator. Thus understood, reform can take many different forms. Since the 
early 1980s, its epitomized model has been that of liberalization, identified to the 
introduction of competition and, most of the time, to privatization. However, it might 
be relevant to retain a broader definition of liberalization, particularly in the water 
sector, in which competition in the market barely exists while competition for the 
market remains a challenge. In this chapter we consider liberalization in the 
continuation of Baumol, Panzar & Willig (1982), as reforms that introduce contestable 
markets. Beside full privatization, private sector participation in its different forms is 
therefore part of that movement. It can even be argued that corporatization, and the 
                                                 
1Both at the Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne (CES), Université de Paris (Panthéon-Sorbonne). 
2
 The literature on water issues is much more substantial than what is available on sanitation, although 
epidemiologists have shown that safe water without adequate sanitation does not do the job (Esrey, 1996). 
3
 This is beginning to change however: on the one hand, reforms become more far-reaching in less developed 
countries and on the other hand, the provision of drinkable water becomes a more critical issue in high income 
countries, its specter already showing up in the Southern belt of the European Union for instance. 
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market pressure it intends to introduce on public entities, is a step in that direction 
since it makes public corporations more responsible and more responsive to 
incentives4.  
This extended concept of liberalization might be useful to capture what has 
been and is still going on in the water sector. Indeed, full privatization remains an 
exception in the sector. In Western Europe, notwithstanding the isolated case of 
England and Wales, liberalization has mainly taken the form of private sector 
participation5. Correspondingly for less developed countries, Gassner, Popov & 
Pushak (2009) show in their extensive survey of reforms of urban water and 
sanitation systems that State Owned Enterprises (SOE)6 still represent the standard 
case. Only 141 reforms translated into significant changes in ownership of the 
entities involved, under the form of private sector participation, of which only 10 
percent is divestiture (ibid. p. 24), with these changes mostly concentrated in Latin 
America and the Caribbean (Gassner, Popov & Pushak 2007, p. 29)7.  
The mixed results achieved by the reform movement make things even more 
complex. Indeed, although the literature on the issue is still very limited, data 
available show ambiguous outcomes when comparing the performance of reformed 
SOE to solutions involving private sector participation; and similarly there is no 
straightforward answer when comparing the performance of the various forms of 
private participation (Ménard & Saussier, 2002; Gassner et al., 2009; Wallsten & 
Kosec, 2008)8. 
In what follows, we focus on organizational alternatives involved in 
liberalization processes as defined above, in order to emphasize the challenging 
institutional changes at stake and the various difficulties these solutions face. Since 
most changes have occurred in urban water systems so far, we leave aside the 
                                                 
4
 The public debate about corporatization is ambiguous, with some viewing corporatization as a step towards full 
privatization while others consider it is a cover for public entities to escape liberalization. 
5
 According to Pinsent Masons (2008), it represents 40 % of the provision of water in this area. However, this 
might be an exception for the time being. In the US, reforming the water sector remains very low on the agenda 
of policy makers. Even in Europe, despite pervasive private sector participation in some countries, the 
liberalization of the water sector keeps being limited in scope and scale, as well illustrated in Finger, Allouche & 
Luis-Manso, 2007. 
6
 By State Owned Enterprises (SOE), we mean all entities owned and monitored by public authorities, central, 
regional, or local. 
7
 However, trends toward private sector participation seem to have developed in Asia over the last years. See  
http://ppi.worldbank.org/explore/ppi_exploreSector.aspx?SectorID=2 (accessed 7 April 2011) 
8
 For recent and challenging views about the successes of private sector participation, see World Bank (2009) 
and Cave (2009).  
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problems of liberalization in the provision of water and irrigation in rural regions, and 
the difficult trade-offs it involves. 
Our chapter is organized as follows. Section I comes back to the 
characteristics of the water sector. It describes some key features that may explain 
the slow pace of reform and that may also help better understanding characteristics 
and limits of that process. Then, a historical and global overview of the liberalization 
movement and the actual state of the water sector is presented. Section II examines 
more specifically the main drivers towards and factors of resistance to the 
liberalization process in the water sector. Section III looks at how these factors 
operate in three models of liberalization, illustrated with as many stylized examples 
from European countries9. Section IV takes stock of this examination to point out 
challenges of liberalization in the water sector, which have to do with guaranteeing 
integrity and coherence of water systems. The conclusion then summarizes our main 
arguments and raises some important issues not discussed in the chapter. 
 
SECTION I: CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WATER SECTOR.  
 
 In order to understand the difficulties faced by reforms of urban water systems 
and the very limited steps towards liberalization, even in countries that championed 
this type of reform, we have to keep in mind some key characteristics of water 
systems.  
 
I.1: Inherent attributes in comparison with other infrastructures. 
On the one hand, water systems share common features with other “critical 
infrastructures” that have been liberalized10. It is a network industry that looks like the 
epitome of a natural monopoly. Urban water systems benefit from substantial 
economies of scale and recent technological developments facilitating the installation 
of insulated cables within water networks allow economies of scope.  
                                                 
9
  There are several reasons why we focus on these examples. First, the examples provide a relatively wide 
spectrum of alternative solutions for liberalization. Second, the institutions, the level of development of these 
countries and the characteristics of their water systems make comparisons meaningful and allow the argument to 
focus on the main issues at stake. Last, but not least, complex matters in developing countries could hardly be 
encompassed in the limits here. 
10
 By critical infrastructures, we mean infrastructures that are fundamental for the functioning of our societies, so 
that they must be reliable, safe, and secured (Kunneke, Groenewegen & Ménard, 2009). 
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On the other hand, there are substantial differences with other network 
industries, such as electricity or gas, not to mention telecommunications, which make 
urban water systems less prone to liberalization. First, the proportion of sunk costs in 
urban water systems has no parallel in other sectors. Second, urban water systems 
benefit from very substantial economies of density, so that competing entities would 
have little incentives to extend the network to areas with small and dispersed 
population. Third, because of the high costs of long distance transportation, urban 
water systems are decentralized. Fourth, the implementation and maintenance of 
water systems involve important externalities: they can disrupt economic activities, as 
when repairs disturb urban traffic; they can benefit from urban planning; and they can 
have an immediate impact on health. Fifth, water has no substitute and concerns all 
human beings, with no exception. As such, it is perceived as a “social” good that 
imposes strict constraints on operators, whether they are public or private, 
particularly when it comes to pricing and operation. Last, because there is no 
substitute, competing usages are a continuous and increasing source of tension.  
As a consequence, urban water systems combine two sets of difficulties that 
hamper “liberalization”. First, the need to maintain the technical integrity of these 
systems under the conditions described above imposes a mode of organization that 
locally remains almost everywhere a ‘natural monopoly’. Second, because these 
monopolistic properties combine with a ‘good’ absolutely essential to human survival, 
water systems require institutions that guarantee the coherence between technical-
organizational requirements and needs to be satisfied: this could well explain why 
water systems remain so tightly regulated, whatever the type of reforms 
implemented11.   
 
I.2: Organization of the water sector. 
Indeed, the slow pace of reform in the water sector contrasts with the 
substantial changes that have affected other network industries. The push towards 
liberalization in the network industries was initiated in the developed countries and 
rapidly took the form of deregulation. It started in the airline industry in the United 
States, with the deregulation process of the late 1970s. The telecommunication 
sector in the US followed shortly after. This movement accelerated throughout the 
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 For a more detailed analysis of these two set of difficulties, see Ménard (2009). 
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1980s with other countries endorsing similar reforms, first with telecommunications, 
then with energy, urban and rail transportation and, later on, water. What was 
acknowledged to work in the developed countries was then exported towards the 
developing world, particularly at the initiative and under the pressure of the World 
Bank in conformity with the so-called “Washington Consensus”12.  
Liberalization then became identified with privatization. However, the two 
concepts differ. Strictly speaking, privatization involves the transfer of property rights 
on assets from public to private entities. Liberalization refers to a broader and in a 
sense less specific policy, which is to introduce competitive pressure, without 
necessarily involving privatization. Whereas full privatization is often viewed as a way 
to reform infrastructures, with telecommunications as the paramount example, 
energy or more recently railways, it was and remains a very uncommon solution in 
the water sector due to its specificities, England & Wales being the main and most 
significant exception. However, rules designed to introduce competitive pressure 
have been adopted in many countries. 
This trend towards liberalization in network industries has been accompanied 
by substantial changes in the mode of regulation. The organization of the market is 
increasingly switching from a “command-and-control” to a contractual approach. In 
network industries, deregulation rarely meant full competition. It rather focused on 
introducing “competition for the market” wherever implementation of “competition in 
the market” was not possible or too costly, and often did so through contracts. 
“Corporatization” of public entities, “Private Sector Participation”, “Public-Private 
Partnership,” became various tools in the hands of market-oriented reformers. Over 
the last 20 years the number of people worldwide provided with drinking water by the 
private sector rose to 753 million13 (Pinsent Masons 2008, p. 30). The actual situation 
and its recent evolution for the different regions in the world are summarized in table 
1. 
 
                                                 
12
 This program is explicit in World Bank (1994). For a summary and discussion of the “Washington 
Consensus”, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Washington_Consensus. (accessed 7 April 2011) 
13
 This number being an estimate (the same author proposes 721 million, p. 40). 
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Table 1: Number of persons served by the private sector per region 
 
Region % people 
2004 2008 
Western Europe 45% 44% 
C & E Europe 5% 10% 
ME & Africa 4% 6% 
South & Central Asia 0% 1% 
South East Asia 6% 12% 
Oceania 10% 25% 
North America 19% 21% 
Latin America 21% 17% 
World total 9% 11% 
 
Source: Adapted from Pinsent Masons (2004, p. 19 and 2008, p.40).  
 
Although the exactitude of such aggregated data remains always debatable, 
the magnitude is unambiguous: only about one tenth of the world’s population 
receives its drinking water from a private entity, often under the form of partnerships 
in which private operators have a rather limited role. Public management is the 
prevailing mode of organizing the water sector, with an overwhelming majority of 
89%. Keeping the perception of water as a social good in mind, this result might not 
be that surprising. The United States and Canada, but also some European countries 
like the Netherlands and Germany, most of the Middle Eastern countries (e.g. Egypt, 
Iran, and Lebanon), all South Asian states and most of Africa are examples for this 
type of water service provision. However, public management takes many different 
forms. There are major differences between direct public management, in which the 
provision of water services depends on the general municipal budget or an 
independent department of the local administration, and delegated public 
management, in which the municipality “delegates” the provision to a communal 
enterprise which operates under company law. The switching from direct to 
delegated public management during a reform process is known as corporatization, 
and can be viewed as a step towards liberalization14. 
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 However, as already mentioned, it could also be viewed as a way to avoid privatization and real competition. 
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A second interesting finding, as shown by table 1, concerns the geographic 
concentration of private sector participation in the provision of water. Indeed, 
substantial private involvement exists primarily in Western Europe (and mainly in the 
United Kingdom and France, to a much lesser extent in Spain, Greece, and Italy), 
which confirms that so far most reforms involving the private sector have been 
implemented in developed countries. Table 1 also shows the state of private sector 
participation in Latin America, for the most part in Chile, but also in Columbia and 
Brazil15.  
However, these numbers can be misleading insofar as providing an umbrella 
to many different forms of private participation. Full privatization, with the sale of the 
physical assets (pipes etc.) and therefore the transfer of the main property and 
decision rights to a private owner, is a mode of organizing the provision of drinking 
water that has found nation-wide application only in England & Wales and is 
otherwise merely very sporadically used (for instance in the Czech Republic or in 
Chile). The concept of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) in turn is much broader, 
including a variety of solutions, which depend on the distribution of decision rights 
between the public and the private party. At one end of the spectrum of PPPs, 
commercial service contracts call the private entity to provide specific services on 
behalf of the municipality, such as billing or collecting invoices. Management and 
lease contracts attribute further responsibilities to the private operator, e.g. the 
operation and maintenance of the water system. This form of PPP is often used 
when the necessary infrastructure already exists. Concessions are at the other end 
of the spectrum: the private partner has not only to operate and maintain the system, 
but also to provide the necessary investments. Figure 1 summarizes the main 
arrangements in the provision of water as classified by the degree of control over 
decision and property rights and the key variables at stake. 
 
Figure 1: Different arrangements for providing water  
(or other public utilities in that respect) 
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 Recent data suggest important breakthrough of private sector participation in Asia 
(http://ppi.worldbank.org/explore/ppi_exploreRegion.aspx?regionID=2) (accessed 7 April 2011) 
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Source: Adapted from Ménard, 2009, p.97 
  
 
SECTION II: DRIVERS AND CHALLENGES TOWARDS LIBERALIZATION IN THE 
WATER SECTOR. 
 
The movement towards liberalization of urban water systems was mainly driven 
by financial and ideological factors. Yet, it turned out to be far less “liberal” than in 
other sectors.  
 
II.1: The main drivers towards reform. 
The most important driver towards water sector reform has been and remains 
finance (Finger et al., 2007, p. 3). While developing countries face the huge costs of 
expanding systems for an explosive urban population, public entities in developed 
countries have to deal with ageing networks that need heavy investments. Even in 
well maintained systems, municipalities have to face investments required by tougher 
quality standards and new legislative frameworks. According to Hall and Lobina 
(2007) the urban wastewater directive of 1991 (91/271/EEC) provides one illustration 
of a regulation having a major impact by significantly increasing the costs of water 
services. In order to implement the standards required and to avoid increased taxes 
or responsibilities for higher prices of water, municipalities have a strong incentive to 
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delegate the provision of water services to private partners, or to corporatize public 
entities in the hope of realizing efficiency gains16. 
The inclination to do so has been amplified by the increasing technical 
complexity of water systems, largely due to the implementation of stringent quality 
standards (Massarutto, Linares & Paccagnan, 2007, p. 198). Even in developed 
countries, municipalities or regional authorities often lack the necessary expertise 
while private water companies have acquired technical know-how during long years 
of business. This may also help to understand why a handful of big companies 
dominate this market. 
Moreover, the massive investments required, either because of higher quality 
standards, or because of the need to renovate ageing systems, or because of the 
demographic explosion in developing cities, are confronted everywhere with major 
budget constraints. For example, in the case of the European Union, the so-called 
“stability pact” of 1992 imposed tougher rules on the budget of the member states, 
with a cascading effect even when water services fell under the responsibility of 
municipalities, since subsidies and/or financial support were increasingly restricted 
(Schouten & van Dijk, 2007, p. 30). Similarly, in developing countries, pressures 
towards liberalization and private sector participation took place in contexts in which 
the water sector crisis combined with major macroeconomic constraints (Shirley & 
Ménard, 2002).  
These factors provided support to the belief that became dominant in the 1990s 
that liberalization would solve these problems at a lower cost than if water remained 
in the hands of public authorities. One must keep in mind that “liberalization paired 
with privatization” was the great slogan of the so-called “Washington Consensus,” 
with the hope that process would feed growth.   
 
II.2. Meeting resistance. 
However, for reasons partially embedded in the specific characteristics of the 
water sector (see Section I), coalitions of interests – including users – tend to 
develop resistance to that process almost everywhere. One reason might be that 
users are unwilling to see the provision of a good essential to their survival and 
without substitute in the hands of private monopolies. Most interestingly, this 
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 See Garcia , Guérin-Schneider & Breuil (2007), p. 57f. 
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resistance seems to be less rooted in the fear of higher tariffs – although this might 
become an issue when pricing rules are perceived as unfair (Shirley & Ménard, 2002) 
– than in the perception that water is a critical infrastructure providing an essential 
public good that should remain within public hands or, at least, under extremely tight 
public control. A review of recent surveys clearly exhibits this trend when it comes to 
water (Bonnet, Dubois, Martimort & Straub, 2006). 
Of course this resistance is fed by rent seeking groups. With liberalization 
identified to privatization or significant private participation and with the perspective 
that “rationalization” will follow with major job cuts, unions tend to oppose these plans 
in order to maintain employment for their members. In several cases, such resistance 
led to changes in the initial plans. For example, in Munich unions successfully 
prevented the corporatization of sanitation services (Lanz, 2005). In some cases, 
public authorities and/or international donors have tried to anticipate these problems, 
accompanying reforms with sweet pills for employees (Shirley, 2002; Pérard, 2007). 
One last obstacle to liberalization comes from government opportunism 
(Savedoff & Spiller, 1999, chapter 1). This problem is rooted in the different length of 
the life cycles of a politician and a public utility, particularly of water systems where 
water pipes can reach roughly 80 years if properly maintained. As a result, public 
officials do not feel too committed to the long-term effects on the network of the 
solutions they adopt. In the long run, providers of water services need to recover the 
high costs of their sunken assets, but in the short run they can survive with prices 
that cover only operating costs, which are well under average costs. This provides 
strong incentives for government opportunism – keeping prices low for electoral 
purposes. Consequently, private sector participation might be discouraged, 
particularly if public commitments are not credible, which depends on institutional 
endowments, notably political institutions. Note that political risks might also hamper 
public corporations, challenging reforms even when there is no change in formal 
ownership.  
 
 
SECTION III: THREE MODELS EXAMPLIFIED BY EUROPEAN CASES. 
 
The distinct forms that liberalization can take in the water sector and the 
problems they face are well illustrated by the recent evolution of several European 
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countries. As suggested above, the need to guarantee the technical integrity of water 
systems and the coherence between a system and the needs it must meet could well 
explain resistance to radical changes, the fact that liberalization has secured local 
integrated monopolies everywhere and that it happened with a rather slow pace.   
In order to substantiate our argument, we focus on the urban water sector in 
three countries: England & Wales, France, and Germany. In our view, they offer 
three alternative models of liberalization in the water sector: England & Wales have 
privatized their water sector as early as 1989; France, which has a long tradition of 
PPP in that sector, has introduced significant changes to increase competitive 
pressure; and Germany has basically maintained the public management of its 
system, although with a trend towards corporatization. In what follows we emphasize 
structural characteristics typifying each form, but we also exhibit commonalities that, 
in our view, come from the need to align the modes of organization to socio-technical 
requirements of urban water systems. 
 
III.1: England & Wales: Full privatization, but close monitoring17. 
The example of England & Wales is unique in that no other country has 
completely privatized its water sector. This case provides a stylized example of how 
financial considerations backed by a strong ideology fed the most radical form of 
liberalization: full divestiture.  
However, this “natural experiment” has at least two distinguishing features with 
respect to reform of other utilities. First, because of the characteristics of water 
systems emphasized above, the sector remains tightly monitored through the very 
visible hand of an independent regulator, the Water Services Regulation Authority 
(OFWAT). Second, and this makes the case even more interesting, while 
liberalization of the water sector in most countries goes hand in hand with a 
decentralization process, it went the opposite direction in England & Wales, having 
been accompanied by an increased centralization. As early as 1973, municipalities 
started losing their grip over water services, with the creation of 10 Regional Water 
Authorities based on river basins. These authorities were not only responsible for 
water resource management but also for the provision of water and sanitation 
services. 
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 For a relatively detailed overview of the UK water sector, see Euromarket 2004a: Case study UK. 
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In 1989, these Regional Water Authorities were privatized and their original 
tasks split. Water resource management fell into the hands of the newly created 
National River Authorities, a public entity that was replaced by the Environmental 
Agency in the mid-90s. The newly created water companies on the other hand were 
legally bound to provide water and sanitation services. They hold both property and 
decision rights, and assume all the risks of a private company. At the same time, they 
operate under severe constraints imposed by several national regulators. Therefore, 
liberalization operates under a quite complex institutional arrangement.  
Of particular interest for our purpose is the role of OFWAT, which is to promote 
competition and to protect consumer interests. Users actively participate in the 
regulation process through the 10 Consumer Councils for Water. These Consumer 
Councils are in direct contact with both the water companies and with OFWAT. By 
dealing with consumer complaints, the Councils play an important role in supporting 
OFWAT’s monitoring of the private water companies. Furthermore, the Consumer 
Councils for Water and OFWAT are legally bound, via the Water Act of 2003, to 
cooperate and exchange information. This can be of particular importance when 
major decisions like a merger of water companies are debated. OFWAT operates as 
a classical regulator, not that different from the traditional regulatory commissions of 
public utilities, setting performance standards and service targets and, above all, 
fixing tariffs. The innovation is that OFWAT uses a price cap mechanism that, in 
principle, is reviewed every five years and automatically takes into account inflation, 
performance, and efficiency. Through benchmarking, OFWAT is also in charge of 
ensuring (virtual) competition. 
However, the five years term was not fully respected. Due to a rapid increase in 
prices paralleled with jumps in profits of operators that generated a public outcry, the 
regulator intervened and changed the rules of the game18. Moreover, there is a 
continuing debate on the effectiveness of a solution with almost no competition in the 
market. Therefore, next to the already existing yardstick competition which is a major 
tool in the hands of the regulator, new instruments have been introduced or are 
under consideration (Euromarket, 2004a, p. 341f; Cave, 2009). One way is the so-
called common carriage which consists in the sharing of one operator’s physical 
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 With the Water Act of 2003, OFWAT’s mission officially switched from facilitating to effectively promoting 
competition. Since then, OFWAT’s price caps have become tighter, squeezing the profits of the private water 
companies. 
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assets (pipes…). Another approach is to enhance competition on the vertical supply 
markets meaning that the water companies delegate intermediate activities to other 
party(ies). Furthermore, the introduction of cross-border supplies is meant to allow 
consumers to get a connection from another supplier. There are also self-contained 
water supplies, with privately-owned wells providing water to one or several sites. 
These independent supplies do not fall under the authority of OFWAT and are 
therefore called unregulated supplies. Finally, within an inset appointment one water 
company replaces another in a specific area. It is the most important of these new 
instruments; nevertheless, use of it has been made in only 18 cases so far (Cave, 
2009, p.6). However, 40 demands for inset appointments are currently waiting for 
approval (Cave, 2009, p. 98). It is possible that the implementation of these 
measures will amplify in the future since the Government recently signaled its 
willingness to further increase competition in the water retail market – in line with the 
underlying wish to achieve a completely competitive retail market in the future, with 
customers freely choosing their provider, alike the electricity sector. Nevertheless, 
the movement into a real competitive water market is slow and loaded with barriers 
as two recent reports show (Cave 2008, 2009).  
To sum up, the need to guarantee the alignment of the new mode of 
organization to the monopolistic properties of water systems and the institutional 
design in which it is embedded, with the key role of the Parliament and of the central 
regulator as its ‘arm’, has ended into a complex arrangement in the UK case. 
Difficulties encountered in the implementation of a truly competitive environment, and 
the tight and finicky regulation that frame the entire urban water system command a 
moderate appraisal of the liberalization implemented through the UK privatization 
model.   
 
III.2: France: More competitive pressure in PPPs, but limited risk-taking19. 
The French way towards liberalization is different. It is rooted in a long tradition 
of Public-Private Partnerships. The first delegation contract in the French water 
system goes back to 1856. However, PPPs have not always been as widespread as 
they are now, due to recent legal changes designed to favor a more open, 
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 If not otherwise mentioned, the numerical data is from Euromarket 2004a. 
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competitive sector20. The main drivers behind the French liberalization movement are 
financial constraints, as in the UK, with ideological forces playing a much more 
subdued role. However, and this differs from the UK, it never reached the point of full 
privatization; and it was accompanied by a movement towards decentralization. 
A turning point in that respect are two laws of decentralization passed in 1982, 
initiating a radical movement of transfer of competences from the central government 
to regional, departmental and municipal levels. Following these laws, the population 
supplied with water services under public management dropped from 50 % to 25 % 
within a few years. 
The movement towards opening water systems to competition for the market 
was also fed by two other factors. Most French political leaders shared the 
widespread view conveyed by the worldwide push towards liberalization that PPPs 
would enhance efficiency. A snowball effect thus developed: impregnated with the 
new power associated to their extended responsibilities and simultaneously 
constrained by increasingly tight budgets, local public authorities succumbed to 
imitation. They found in widely publicized successful PPPs a source of inspiration for 
reforming their own water services, with the promise of efficiency gains and an 
alleviated financial burden. Another law adopted in 1999 (the so-called 
“Chevènement law”), on inter-municipal cooperation, strengthened this trend by 
encouraging administrative unitization among small and medium size communities. 
Nowadays, only 21% of the population get their water through public management 
(Aubin & Varone, 2007, p.47). Hence, 79% of the population are provided by one of 
the three major French water operators: Veolia, Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux, and 
SAUR. This means that, while liberalization accompanied decentralization in France 
whereas it went side by side with administrative centralization in the UK, liberalization 
produced similar effects when it comes to the organization of the industry: it favored 
big operators. This trend towards concentration was amplified by the increasingly 
demanding EU standards for drinking water and wastewater treatment. Being 
absurdly small sized, most French municipalities lacked the necessary know-how to 
comply with the tougher regulation and had to turn towards the expertise of the 
leading firms (Pezon, 2008).  
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 The movement is still going on. A new law was adopted on July 28, 2008, to facilitate Public-Private 
Partnerships in the provision of public infrastructures and services. 
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However, liberalization remains limited. First, as almost everywhere in water 
systems, there is no competition in the market, while competition for the market 
attracts at best two or three competitors (most of the time from the big three). 
Moreover, 88% of delegation agreements in the sector are lease contracts 
(affermage in French), which means that the responsibility to invest (and the 
associated risks) stays with the municipality while the operator maintains and 
operates the network and manages the services. In almost all cases, the private 
operator collects water bills, takes a share contractually agreed upon, and transfers 
the remaining part to the municipality for re-investments in the system.  
Hence, unlike the British model, risks are not fully shouldered by the private 
operator but shared, so that there is a significant gap between property rights and 
decision rights. Another difference is that the system is monitored through contractual 
agreements, not through an independent regulator. However, contracts are tightly 
bounded. It was already so for PPPs before the push towards liberalization. In the 
1990s, the eruption of corruption scandals linked to bribery for obtaining delegation 
contracts and other irregularities put the model under pressure (Domanski, 2006). In 
order to better monitor the contractual regime, partly through intensified competition 
for the market, new laws were introduced. The so-called “Sapin Act” from 1993 
intended to prevent corruption and to increase transparency, among other measures 
by making public tendering compulsory. Not long after, the so-called “Barnier Act” 
(1995) specified the rules for PPPs, clarifying conditions of entry, restricting contract 
duration, and forcing public authorities to publish annual reports on performance. It 
was rapidly followed by another law, the “Mazeaud Act”, also from 1995, reducing the 
possibilities to extend contracts and obliging private operators to deliver annual 
reports to the delegating authorities. 
How much these measures have enhanced competition in the French water 
sector is debatable. In a 1997 report, the French National Audit Office already 
highlighted the large number of exceptions to these laws, particularly with respect to 
the duration21, and the problems resulting from a highly oligopolistic market structure, 
with three players leading the ball. Moreover, the propensity to keep risks in the 
hands of public authorities might facilitate private participation, but it also severely 
                                                 
21
 There is a possibility to extend contracts if initially unplanned investments have been made by an operator. 
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restricts responsibilities for private operators. Whether liberalization has favored 
competition therefore remains an issue.  
 
III.3: Germany: Corporatization as a step towards liberalization22?   
Of our three liberalization models for the water sector, the German one is 
clearly the less striking. Among the many factors that may explain this situation, a 
leading one might be embedded in the very nature of German political institutions. 
Germany is a federal state. Since each of the 16 states (Länder) has its specific law, 
the water sector is extremely fragmented, with thousands of small, local operators 
and many different modes of organization.  
Consequently, no big operators dominate the national market, contrarily to the 
French or British situation. Only about 30% of the German population obtain their 
water under arrangements involving private sector participation, and this represents 
only about 9% of the total number of operating entities. The private sector is mostly 
active in big cities and in the eastern part of Germany (where, after the reunification, 
deteriorated water networks required heavy investments at a time of tight constraints 
on public finance).  
In fact, PPPs remain the exception. Most of the water services are run under 
public management. Strong resistance towards liberalization developed in Germany, 
not only due to opposition by unions, but also because of persistent reluctance 
among the population to see water “privatized”. A recent public opinion poll shows 
that 84% of the Germans are against further private sector involvement in the supply 
of stately provided services23. And regularly, when German municipalities’ citizens 
are given the possibility to decide in a referendum, there are very strong reactions 
against private sector involvement in local public utilities. Illustrations are provided by 
the case of Münster, a city of 270,000 in the west of Germany, whose citizens voted 
“no” on the privatization of the municipal multi-utility24 in 2001 with a 2/3 majority and, 
more recently, by the case of Leipzig, a city of 511,000 in the east of Germany, 
where 87% of votes were against a partial sale of 49.9% of the stock to Gaz de 
France. 
                                                 
22
 For an analysis of the German water sector see Euromarket (2004a): Case Study Germany and Domanski 
(2006). 
23
 Public opinion poll undertaken by Forsa, January 2008. 
24
 In Germany, multi-utilities are a very common way of providing local public services like water, gas, and 
electricity through one provider, the Stadtwerke.  
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However, pressures to “liberalize” the system have had an impact. Germany is 
moving away from the traditional Regiebetriebe, that is, from direct public 
management with water services run within municipal departments and financed by 
the general municipal budget. Severely criticized by the EU and the OECD 
(Palaniappan, Cooley, Gleick & Wolff, 2006, p. 12 f.), among others, as lacking 
transparency and being opaque, the old form of direct public management is 
progressively leaving way to “corporatization”.  
Due to the federal structure of Germany and its extremely fragmented water 
sector, it is difficult to find consistent data concerning the different modes of 
organization. However, a study of the German Association of Energy and Water 
Industries (BGW, 2005, pp. 14 ff.) indicates an interesting development. The data on 
the water utilities show clearly that the German water sector has known a process of 
corporatization from 1986 to 200325. Whereas direct public management under the 
form of Eigenbetriebe accounted for 63.3% of the water volume in 1986, it was only 
14.9% in 2003 (and even only 4% in 2005). During the same period, corporatized 
utilities have grown from 12.7% to 30.2%. 
The main reason for this liberalization movement through corporatization lies 
in the growing financial pressure on municipal budgets. Municipalities hope to gain 
from corporatization in two ways. Firstly, once the utility is corporatized, it is more 
difficult for users to point the finger at the city council and blame the municipal 
administration for a service that is not perceived as functioning properly. Secondly, 
there is the hope to benefit from efficiency gains that can be realized within a more 
disciplining mode of organization which also leaves room for more powerful 
incentives.  
 
 
SECTION IV: SOME RESULTS AND TRENDS: COMFORTING, PUZZLING, OR 
DISTURBING?   
 
The three cases of England & Wales, France and Germany illustrate well the 
many different forms that the introduction of market pressures can take in the water 
sector. A key argument behind the liberalization movement is that the introduction of 
                                                 
25
 This trend is further confirmed by a more recent study (BGW 2008, p. 14). 
 19
private interest or at least the very possibility of private sector participation would 
enhance performance26. However, this remains much debated in empirical works. 
 
IV.1: Mixed impact of changes in the allocation of property and decision rights. 
At the empirical level, several studies on the effect of the reallocation of 
ownership on efficiency exhibit ambiguous results in the water sector. Studies from 
Ménard and Saussier (2002), Pérard (2007); Gassner et al. (2007, 2009); Wallsten 
and Kosec (2008), among others, suggest that ownership may not be the key issue, 
which does not mean that it can be ignored. At the same time, Cave (2008; 2009) 
and a recent report from the World Bank (2009) emphasize the advantages of private 
participation, although not necessarily full privatization in the case of the World Bank. 
And a challenging fact is that major operators at the international level do not lobby 
that much in favour of full privatization.  
Whereas the standard economic theory predicts inefficient public ownership, 
case based evidence raises questions about such a general statement. Pérard 
(2007, p. 31) suggests that public water services can be managed very efficiently 
when the institutional setting is right, as he illustrates in the case of Tunisia, with 
efficient water services provided by two centralized agencies monitored by the 
government27. In this country, water is reasonably priced and represents 0.65% of 
the per capita income per month28. At the same time, an unaccounted-for-water 
(UFW) of 18% keeps up with the 19.2% of the completely privatized water services of 
England and Wales and is even better when compared to the 26.4% of the French 
PPPs (BGW, 2005, p. 24).  
Wallsten and Kosec (2006) confirm the view that ownership alone does not 
explain the performance of water utilities. It is rather the competitive pressure that 
makes the difference: benchmarking leads to a better performance. This might be 
compatible with public ownership, if benchmarking is implemented. Our three 
liberalization models may well substantiate this argument. The German water sector, 
with thousands of small, (mainly) public entities that allow citizens/consumers to 
compare price and quality, outperforms the two other models. According to the BGW 
                                                 
26
 This is tying up to the considerations about contestable markets, where the simple threat of some other 
company chasing away the incumbent is sufficient to improve the latter’s performance. 
27
 See also Touzi (2009). A similar conclusion can be derived from the case study on Santiago-de-Chile in 
Shirley (2002, chap.6). 
28
 Own calculations based on Baietti, Kingdom & van Ginneken, 2006, p. 5 and SONEDE 
(http://www.sonede.com.tu/fra/E_SC.html (12.01.2009). 
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study (2005, p. 24), which looked at several key indicators, water loss is at a high in 
France, with 26.4% UFW , followed by England & Wales (19.2%), while Germany 
exhibits a low 7.3% of UFW29. Consistently, investments per cubic meter of water are 
highest in Germany (0.55€), followed by England & Wales (0.47€), with France 
significantly behind (0.37€). Last, the per capita water bill per year for a standardized 
water consumption accounts for 100€ in England & Wales and 85€ in France, while it 
accounts for 82€ in Germany. 
Of course, these indicators are very incomplete and do not provide clear-cut 
“proofs” of the performance of the alternative models for liberalization. However they 
converge with some other troubling factors.  
When it comes to full privatization, one could point out flaws in the institutional 
design of innovative solutions. For example, in the English & Welsh case, the 
regulator (OFWAT) plays a major role with respect to the performance of the sector. 
Changes in its mission over time have generated uncertainties. While its initial role 
was to facilitate competition, it has progressively shifted towards actively promoting it, 
leading to tighter price caps over recent years. As a result, tariffs for water services in 
England & Wales are quite low. But at the same time this pressure on the operators 
leads to under-investments and the prospect of deterioration of the networks in the 
medium term. Furthermore, OFWAT’s credibility has been undermined when the 
regulator did not enforce the fines it imposed on some operators. Moreover, new 
instruments have not proven to significantly improve competition. If this will change in 
the future, due to recent developments, such as the promised movement towards 
some retail competition, needs to be awaited (Cave, 2009, p. 77). 
If we now turn to the second model of liberalization, PPPs, we are immediately 
confronted to standard problems of tariff increases, under-investment, especially 
towards the ending period of contracts, risk-averse strategies of operators so that 
public authorities tend to bear most of the uncertainties, and the very high rate of 
renegotiations, all of which questions the presumed efficiency of this mode of 
organization. In his extensive study of PPPs in Latin America, Guasch (2004) 
                                                 
29
 These numbers are consistent with data provided by the French Environment Institute (IFEN) and the 
economic regulator for the English and Welsh water sector (OFWAT), see http://www.ifen.fr/donnees-
essentielles/eau/gestion-de-l-eau-potable-et-des-eaux-usees/la-distribution-de-l-eau-potable.html?taille= and 
http://www.ifen.fr/actualites/presse/detail-d-un-communique-ou-dossier/article/eau-
potable.html?tx_ttnews[backPid]=879&cHash=012221ae42 for the French case and 
http://themes.eea.europa.eu/Specific_media/water/indicators/WQ06,2003.1001 for England & Wales (accessed 3 
June 2009). 
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showed that 74.4% of water contracts were renegotiated, on average only after 1.6 
years!  From a transaction cost perspective, these frequent renegotiations are very 
costly: directly, because they bind the parties in a process that takes 3 to 12 months, 
mobilising experts, lawyers and so forth; but also indirectly since they undermine the 
credibility of the operators, the public authority, and ultimately the supporting 
institutions. More recently, Gassner et al. (2009) concluded their review of the private 
sector participation in electricity and water distribution with some scepticism about 
the overall impact of PPPs 
Last, if we turn to corporatization, it also confronts problems, particularly 
because of political interferences on tariffs and employment. A major issue with 
respect to the performance of public corporations concerns overstaffing, as well 
illustrated by the German case of Munich. The ratio of employees per 1000 
connections of the city’s utility provider amounts to 19.5 albeit a ratio of 4 or 5 is 
usually considered enough to deliver satisfactory performance. 
 
IV.2: Expectations: Showdown… or slowdown?  
Taking these difficulties into account, what future can be expected for 
liberalization in the water sector, and particularly for private sector participation?  
First of all, we have to keep in mind that the implication of the private sector in 
water services remains low. It represents only 11% of the provision of drinkable water 
worldwide, although the percentage is higher in urban areas (25%), since operators 
can take advantage of density effects, particularly in urban areas of developed 
countries (33%). Moreover, the push towards PPPs, especially in developing 
countries has been quite bumpy (Pérard, 2007; Gassner et al., 2007)30. 
Nevertheless, PPPs are still viewed as an important option for developing countries 
since they should allow access to capital and the necessary expertise. At the same 
time, data suggest that private operators are increasingly reluctant to assume risks of 
significant investments, which finds an expression in the growing role of management 
and lease contracts (Palaniappan et al., 2006), in which the main risks remain with 
the public party. In many cases, the trend is rather towards corporatization, with the 
end of mega-concessions (Saghir, 2006). 
                                                 
30
 For detailed data on the evolution of PPPs, see the World Bank Private Participation Infrastructures database 
at: http://ppi.worldbank.org/explore/ppi_exploreSector.aspx?sectorID=4 (accessed 7 April 2011) 
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This revision of the initial optimism might very well affect developed countries as 
well. In the European Union, the Commission has passed a procurement directive 
intending to favour the delegation of public services and to intensify competitive 
pressures. However, the same authority has imposed tougher regulation as well as 
full cost recovery for externalities, thus introducing elements of uncertainty that might 
make private operators reluctant to assume too many risks in long run investments31.  
This may partly explain some significant evolutions regarding the liberalization 
of the water sector in the EU32. First, the English model of complete divestiture 
remains unique and has not been imitated.  
Second, private sector participation seems to have been increasingly associated 
with the role of large groups, feeding an oligopolistic structure. Even within the 
English model, there has been a significant movement towards vertically integrated 
companies. As a result, the English Authorities have amended the Water Industry Act 
from 1991 with the Enterprise Act (2002), which imposes tighter monitoring of future 
merger and acquisition projects33. Nevertheless, the trend towards integration 
remains powerful everywhere, including among public corporations. Pezon (2008) 
highlights the increasing role of supra-communal authorities integrating several water 
and sewerage services in France, particularly in rural areas34.   
Third, several water companies facing increased financial pressures have 
proposed arrangements in which networks would be run by private non-profit 
organizations that would “delegate” the service provision to for-profit companies 
(Euromarket, 2004a). Liberalization would then involve switching from Public Private 
Participation to Private-Private Participation, with a quasi-public entity assuming 
almost all risks. 
Hence, liberalization in the water sector is no longer identified with full 
privatization and is even less identified than before with substantial private sector 
participation. In France, private operators remain welcome, particularly in areas with 
a low population density since public authorities are faced with heavy investments 
required by tougher regulations that they can hardly face. Unfortunately these are 
also areas less attractive for private operators. Simultaneously, there are signs of 
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 See European Commission (2008). 
32
 For an overview of a similar trend in the US, see Warner (2007). 
33
 However, as a reaction to the Cave report from 2008, the Government considers reviewing the current merger 
regime, which has been criticized as being too rigid (Cave, 2009, p. 77). 
34
 The trend towards integration in the sector has also been noticed in developing countries (see Pérard, 2006). 
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pressure towards re-municipalization in larger and more profitable cities (Grenoble, 
already in the 1990s, and now Paris, and possibly other major cities)35. In Germany, 
the Federal Agency for Hydrology has explicitly opposed the liberalization movement 
(Bundesanstalt für Gewässerkunde, 2002, p. 28), arguing that under the existing 
publicly monitored regime the quality of drinking water is exceptionally high in 
international comparison, with a highly secure supply. However, the need to improve 
the efficiency of the system has been acknowledged, and a working group has 
defined a modernization strategy that would rely on benchmarking (including among 
corporatized utilities) as well as on economies of scale and scope through integration 
of water and sewerage services, a sensitive issue in Germany because of the 
diversity of fiscal rules among municipalities and Länder as well as between these 
two sectors.  
All in all, there seems to be an agreement that the trend towards more 
concentration is widespread in Europe (Euromarket, 2004b). An issue then becomes 
whether this will favor a handful of very large companies, be they private or public, 
thus creating a very oligopolistic market structure at the European level. 
 
CONCLUSION. 
 In this chapter, we have developed two main points. First, we have argued that 
“liberalization” is a relatively vague concept, providing an umbrella for many different 
types of reform. For a time, it has been identified to privatization. However, full 
privatization in the drinkable water sector, on which we focused here, remains a very 
exceptional case so far. If we relax the concept of liberalization in order to focus on 
the idea that it corresponds to the introduction of competitive pressures, then there 
has been unambiguously a powerful movement towards liberalization in the water 
sector, with the prevalence of two main models that are distinct from full privatization: 
PPPs, which take different forms of contractual arrangements that basically introduce 
more or less intense ‘competition for the market’; and “corporatization”, that is, the 
transformation of services providing water into legally and economically autonomous 
entities accountable for their performance very much like a private firm would be, so 
that benchmarking becomes possible. 
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 A similar trend for water and other utilities might also be on its way in the US (see Warner, 2007). 
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Second, referring to three “stylized” examples from Europe, with comparable 
and converging environments in terms of standards of living, consumption of water, 
technologies in use, etc., we have exhibited mixed results for the three “models” 
under review. One reason for this state of affair is that modes of organization for 
providing water evolve slowly and are deeply embedded in specific institutions that 
combine national traditions, as with the French PPPs, and micro-institutions, as with 
the German local water utilities. But even more importantly, we have argued that 
there are specific characteristics of the water sector that may well explain resistance 
to liberalization, perceived as a transfer of property rights and/or of decision rights 
that would deprive citizens from their control over a non standard good. These 
specific characteristics affect both the supply side, since water provision obeys 
conditions that are very close to that of a pure natural monopoly, and the demand 
side, since water is so crucial for human survival and therefore so politically sensitive. 
As a result, drinking water provision is a highly exposed activity, that can 
hardly escape opportunistic pressures that take many different forms: political 
opportunism from public authorities, opportunistic behavior from operators (whether 
they are private or public), and third party opportunism from interest groups (including 
consumer associations). Consequently, liberalization in the water sector is a mode of 
reform that has a dense and omnipresent institutional dimension. It is at risk of 
generating high economic and political transaction costs, thus creating uncertainties 
or even having dramatic consequences that feed suspicion regarding liberalization. 
Shirley and Ménard (2002) argued that this might contribute to explain the slow pace 
of reforms in the water sector, and the dramatic events it often requires before these 
reforms are initiated. It is most of the time only when major macro tensions, such as 
very tight financial constraints, combine with sector crisis, as when drinkable water 
does not reach significant segments of the population, that restructuring water 
systems comes high on political agendas.  
Ultimately, for all these reasons, one can predict with a quite high probability 
that liberalization in drinking water systems and the introduction of competitive 
pressures will remain on the agenda and, at the same time, with limited effects. One 
may even suspect that with the increasing scarcity of the resource and the growing 
conflicts of interest among its users, public control will increase rather than decrease. 
We are entering in a world in which strategic control over water becomes also a 
geostrategic issue. 
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